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A Social Relational Account of Affect 
Abstract 
Sociology usually conceives of emotions as individual, episodic, and categorical phenomena, 
while at the same time emphasizing their social and cultural construction. In this article, I argue 
that this view neglects some essential elements of emotions, in particular affects, and how these 
are vital to our understanding of sociality. Although affect is an established notion in sociology, 
it has remained conceptually underdeveloped. The article therefore discusses different perspec-
tives on affect from the vibrant field of affect studies that emphasize their relational and bodily 
character. In a second step, I contrast and reconcile these views with existing theories of affect 
in sociology and social psychology and consider a number of essential characteristics that can 
be used to circumscribe affect. Finally, I introduce concepts from relational sociology and con-
crete examples to specify the relational character of affect and to develop an understanding of 
affect that is both theoretically and empirically fruitful. 
Keywords: affect, emotion, relations, body, sociology 
1 Introduction 
The sociology of emotion has developed perspectives on actors, interactions, and societies that 
go beyond normative and instrumental-rational accounts. Sociologists have shown that emo-
tions are important for human agency, for social interactions, and for understanding communi-
ties and societies. A key factor to understanding the potential of human emotion for social af-
fairs is the conjecture that they are social and cultural through and through. This means, first, 
that emotions do not arise arbitrarily across individuals, but rather in more or less systematic 
ways, for example with regard to dominant power hierarchies or stratification. Second, emo-
tions are closely tied to norms and values, both with regard to the situations in which emotions 
arise, i.e., how they are experienced, communicated, and reflected-upon, and with regard to the 
place they have in culture, e.g., whether they are highly valued or despised.  
While strongly emphasizing that emotions are socially and culturally constructed, sociol-
ogists at the same time understand emotions as individual, intentional, episodic, and categorical 
phenomena. They usually assume that human individuals “have” emotions, i.e. that they expe-
rience and express “their” emotions. For example, Thoits (1989: 318) conceives of emotions as 
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involving cognitive appraisals and changes in physiological or bodily sensations and 
Hochschild (1979) defines emotion as “as bodily cooperation with an image, a thought, a 
memory – a cooperation of which the individual is aware” (p. 551). In a similar vein, Kemper 
(1987: 263) suggests that emotions are “autonomic-motoric-cognitive states”. Sociological con-
cepts of emotion also tend to view emotions as intentional because they are directed at or about 
something. For example, people are ashamed of somebody or angry at their spouses. This as-
sumption clearly requires mind-related principles of intentionality and representation that are 
widely attributed to humans.  
Moreover, sociology usually conceives of emotions as episodic, i.e., time-discrete phe-
nomena. People experience an emotion during a specific timeframe and many emotions are 
considered to be rather short-lived, lasting seconds or minutes rather than hours or days. Of 
course, emotions like sadness or guilt may last much longer, but the general idea is that most 
emotions have more or less clearly defined beginnings and endings. Finally, many sociologists 
concur with accounts in evolutionary psychology that emotions are distinct “natural kinds” 
(Griffiths, 2004), i.e., that they can be categorized along clearly defined sets of bodily, cogni-
tive, and phenomenal components (e.g., Turner, 2007). This categorical perspective rests on 
the assumption of a limited number of emotions that have an important survival value.  
Given this – admittedly overgeneralized – view of emotions, the social and cultural come 
into play as forces that either provide or influence the circumstances under which emotions 
arise, or constitute and shape the ways in which emotions are expressed, regulated, or commu-
nicated. In other words, society influences when and how emotions come into existence and 
how emotions are acted upon. In this paper, I want to argue that – although this view without 
doubt has its merits –, it neglects some essential elements of emotions and how these are vital 
to our understanding of sociality. I suspect that this neglect is due to early sociological concep-
tions that, although adding an important social and cultural “edge” to emotions, retained a view 
still close to Darwinian and “natural kinds” approaches, borrowing from them the (limiting) 
notion that emotions are individual, intentional, episodic, and categorical “entities”. Although 
this may be an adequate conception of what an emotion is, it is unnecessarily restrictive for 
those elements that many assume to be at the core of emotions, for example subjective feelings 
or action potentials.  
Although feelings are not confined to emotions, but are more or less ubiquitous in our 
lives, for example as hunger, pain, or elation, some have argued that at the core of an emotion 
is an affect which is often understood as an evaluative feeling, i.e. a feeling that conveys a 
positive or negative phenomenal experience, often with a certain action tendency. In fact, some 
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sociologists and psychologists have argued that emotions are not “natural kinds”, but rather 
discursively delineated constellations of affect, situation, and cognitive appraisals (Thoits, 
1989; Barrett, 2014). Although the notion of affect is implicated in emotions, it is a broader and 
more elementary category that is not conceptually restricted in the way emotions are, for exam-
ple regarding their episodic and categorical character.  
Therefore, the concept of affect may open up novel perspectives on how individuals expe-
rientially relate to and make sense of the social world. Whereas analyses of emotion usually 
capitalize on momentary and often exceptionally intense “outbursts” in experience, affect re-
flects a general, ubiquitous, and bodily “mode of being”. Importantly, it denotes a strong cona-
tive or motivational momentum and is therefore critical to action. In the following, I thus want 
to further probe the usefulness of the concept of affect for sociological analysis, in particular 
for questions of how individuals are embedded in different social formations. I will do so by 
first reviewing different understandings of affect. In a first step, I will discuss different concep-
tions of affect in cultural studies, which on the one hand are a major source of inspiration for 
how affect can inform sociological inquiry, but on the other hand are hard to operationalize for 
empirical research. In a second step, I will introduce two perspectives on affect in sociology 
and social psychology and work out differences and commonalities between these approaches. 
Third, I will suggest an understanding of “relational affect” that retains many of the theoretical 
propositions found in cultural studies but is methodologically sound and hence close to the 
accounts in sociology and social psychology. Finally, I will briefly use this concept to illustrate 
how individuals are embedded in social formations. 
2 Affect in Cultural Studies 
Within cultural studies, affect has come to occupy a central place in theorizing and some have 
referred to this shift as an “affective turn” (Clough, 2007). Affect is widely believed to be a 
necessary counterpart to language, discourse, and conceptual thought and is valued mainly be-
cause it is closely tied to matter and bodies of various sorts, as opposed to symbols, language, 
and thought. Generally, there is a striking variety of different understandings of affect within 
cultural studies (Leys, 2011; Whetherell, 2012; Seigworth and Gregg, 2010). Because this is 
not the place to review the literature in its entirety, I resort to two reviews of the field in an 
attempt at systematizing these understandings. Leys (2011) as well as Seigworth and Gregg 
(2010) have suggested that there are at least two distinct perspectives on and conceptualizations 
of affect, one that grounds the understanding of affect in a revisionary ontology, whereas the 
other perspective is not primarily concerned with ontological issues but rather construes affect 
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as the capacities of (animal) bodies to act and to affect other bodies. Although these approaches 
may be seen to reflect opposing ends on a continuum of different understandings of affect, they 
are nonetheless fruitful in their potential to advance sociological theorizing and research on 
affect and emotion. 
2.1 Affect – an ontological perspective 
One perspective on affect is strongly inspired by the writings of Spinoza, Bergson, and Deleuze 
and Guattari. Affect in these works initially has little to do with feelings and emotions, but 
rather is part of an ontology that centers on processes, relations, and the effects that bodies have 
on one another. As such, these writings can be considered landmarks of an “ontological turn” 
in parts of philosophy and the social sciences that, although highly diverse and debated in itself, 
is characterized by challenging the central position of human beings in most of Western social 
thought; by the notion that agency should not be understood as intentional action, but rather as 
“efficacy” that is distributed across assemblages of humans and non-humans; and by the idea 
that the social and political are constituted and fueled by non-conscious and bodily affect (Joro-
nen & Häkli, 2016).  
Within this paradigm, affect is supposed to be an autonomous force between bodies that is 
best expressed not in terms of feelings or experiences, but of intensities of relations that impinge 
– either by increasing or by diminishing – a body’s potential to act. Affect therefore primarily 
refers to bodies’ reciprocal capacities “to affect and be affected” (Clough, 2007: 2). Seigworth 
and Gregg (2010) state that “affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to 
act and be acted upon. Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes 
more sustained state of relations as well as the passages […] of forces or intensities. That is, 
affect is found in those intensities that pass body to body (human, non-human, part-body and 
otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, between and sometimes stick to bodies and 
worlds, and in the very passages or variations between these intensities and resonances them-
selves” (p. 1).  
In a similar vein, Massumi (2002) as one of the key proponents of affect theory conceives 
of affect first and foremost as intensity, decidedly contrasting it with emotion, which he sees as 
a form of subjective content. He holds that whereas the term “emotion” is reserved for “person-
alized content”, affect stands for “the continuation”, is “situational” and “trans-situational” and 
“the invisible glue that holds the world together” (Massumi, 2002: 217). Likewise, Thrift (2004) 
prefers to not work with notions of “individualized emotions” but instead with concepts of af-
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fect that carry the notion of “broad tendencies and lines of force” (ibid., p. 175). And for Black-
man (2012), “affect is not a thing but rather refers to processes of life and vitality which circu-
late and pass between bodies and which are difficult to capture or study in any conventional 
methodological sense” (p. 4).  
Although these are only select fragments of an extensive and complex body of scholarship, 
they suffice to illustrate the place that affect occupies in an ontology that capitalizes on pro-
cesses, relations, and efficacies within and between bodies. Importantly, bodies in this ontolog-
ical framework are not only human bodies, but encompass all kinds of bodies that can affect 
and be affected, for instance an animal, a table, a book, or a tree. Taking this for granted, it is 
no surprise that one of the key characteristics of affect in this perspective is that it is bodily and 
often described as non-conscious, pre-discursive, pre-linguistic, and  “asocial, but not 
presocial” (Massumi, 1995: 91).  
Because affect in this paradigm is conceived of as a force or relational intensity between 
potentially very different sorts of bodies, Whetherell (2012: 19ff) notes that affect often seems 
to be construed as preceding the cultural and the discursive and with that various forms of 
symbolic meaning and signification. In this view, affect is also considered ubiquitous (although 
subject to various dynamics) among bodies, and not something that has a clear beginning and 
end, and hence there is no state of affairs that is ever void of affect. Therefore, affect in this 
paradigmatic perspective is frequently talked about in the singular, not least to demarcate its 
being distinct from any categorical thinking that dominates standard ontologies and the emo-
tions literature. 
2.2 Affect – a bodily capacity perspective 
The second widespread understanding of affect in a much stronger way draws on the psychol-
ogy and neuroscience of emotion, in particular on the works of Sylvan Tomkins. Many authors 
have attributed the influence of Tomkins’s approach on affect studies to an essay by Sedgwick 
and Frank (1995). Tomkins argued that affect should be seen as a separate and basic system of 
human functioning that operates independently of drives and cognitions and is firmly anchored 
in human biology and evolutionary adaptation. Inspired by Darwin’s works, Tomkins suggested 
that “affects are comprised of correlated sets of responses involving the facial muscles, the 
viscera, the respiratory system, the skeleton, autonomic blood flow changes, and vocalizations 
that act together to produce an analogue of the particular gradient or intensity of stimulation 
impinging on the organism” (Demos, 1995: 19). These orchestrated responses, then, are the 
affect, and “not an expression of something else” (ibid.). Moreover, Tomkins held that there is 
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an evolutionary stable set of eight orchestrated responses that have evolved to signal urgency 
and to initiate action, called “affect programs” (Tomkins and McCarter, 1964: 120). This is why 
affect in Tomkins’s perspective, much like in the views expressed in the “ontological” ap-
proach, is generated outside conscious awareness and is primarily a bodily response towards 
some event or object.  
Tomkins’s conception of affect stridently made its way into cultural studies and promoted 
an understanding of affect that is closer to feeling and emotion and hence to human bodies and 
their role in thought, cognition, perception, and behavior. Affect here is understood as an indi-
rect “form of thinking” or a “different kind of intelligence about the world” (Thrift, 2008: 175). 
Likewise, Blackman holds that “affect refers to those registers of experience which cannot be 
easily seen and which might variously be described as non-cognitive, trans-subjective, non-
conscious, non-representational, incorporeal and immaterial” (Blackman, 2012: 4). And Bren-
nan equally emphasizes the human body when she states that affect “is the physiological shift 
accompanying a judgment” (Brennan, 2004: 5). 
The term affect, as it is presently used across cultural studies and sometimes within the 
same theories, thus seems to have at least two different referrents. On the one hand, it is used 
to denote a force or an intensity of relations or something that circulates between different sorts 
of bodies, on the other hand it denotes modes or states of human bodies and the feelings and 
capacities that go along with these modes. Although this usage of the term is somewhat impre-
cise, both views are not entirely incompatible and can be made fruitful for sociological analysis 
not least because they have reputable counterparts in social theorizing: The focus on relation-
ality is essential to relational approaches to sociality (e.g., Donati, 2012; Crossley, 2012) and 
the emphasis on feelings and human bodies is critical to established sociological and social 
psychological notions of affect (e.g., Heise, 1979). In the following section, I will first discuss 
these sociological and social psychological notions of affect and then proceed to infuse them 
with understandings of affect in cultural studies and a relational approach to sociality. 
3 Sociological and Social Psychological Models of Affect 
Although the individual, intentional, episodic, and categorical perspective on emotion is still 
dominant, and emotion and affect are often treated synonymously, sociologists as well social 
psychologists have for some time developed original theories of affect that go beyond the lim-
itations of the discrete emotions approach. 
SFB 1171 Affective Societies – Working Paper 03/16 
 7
3.1 Psychological Constructionism 
Probably the most prominent concept of affect in social psychology is part of Russell’s and 
Feldman-Barrett’s (1999) “psychological constructionist” theory, strongly inspired by Wundt 
and James. In their view, affect or “core affect”, “refers to the most elementary consciously 
accessible affective feelings […] that need not be directed at anything” (Russell and Barrett, 
1999: 806). Examples of affect include tension, pleasure, or elation. Affect is thought to be 
“free-floating”, like ebbs and flows across time, and a person is presumed to always be in some 
affective state. Affect varies in intensity, it can be hardly consciously perceived in low intensi-
ties, but can likewise overwhelm conscious experience when highly intense. Although affect is 
assumed to be free floating, it is caused by something, although these causes need not be con-
sciously perceived. Despite the view that affect need not be consciously directed at anything, it 
can become directed at something, for example as part of an emotion or when attributed to some 
entity (Russell and Barrett, 1999: 806).  
Importantly, affect is considered “a basic kind of psychological meaning” (Barrett and 
Bliss-Moreau, 2009: 172, emphasis added), it is a “psychological primitive” that is “crucial to 
the conscious experience of the world around us” (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009: 172). Affect 
and changes in affect “are often experienced as a property of an object, in much the same way 
as color” is. (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009: 172) There is some consensus that affect can best 
be described or represented as combinations of basic experiences of pleasure or displeasure and 
some degree of arousal. This view stands in notable contrast to “basic emotion” theories arguing 
– along the lines of Tomkins – that universal “affect programs” correspond to a fixed set of 
basic or primary emotions. Psychological constructionism denies the existence of this fixed 
correspondence and instead argues that conceptual acts differentiate core affect into discrete 
emotions (Barrett, 2014). This view also opposes “appraisal theories” of emotion elicitation 
(e.g., Scherer, 2005) that place stronger emphasis on cognitions in generating and differentiat-
ing discrete emotions. Historically, psychological constructionism is related to longstanding 
debates in psychology on the role of cognition in generating emotion. In this debate, Zajonc 
(1980) had forcefully argued that affect, which he considered a positive or negative valence or 
quality, can be generated without the involvement of (higher) cognitive processes, but that cog-
nitions are indeed necessary for fully blown emotions. 
3.2 Affect Control Theory 
In sociology, the term affect is most prominent in Heise’s (1979) Affect Control Theory (ACT) 
and the works inspired by this theory. Affect in this account does not differ substantially from 
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the views of psychological constructionism (see Rogers et al., 2014). However, affect in soci-
ology is often conceived of as the more inclusive category than emotion. Smith-Lovin (1995), 
for example, holds that “Affect is the most general term; it refers to any evaluative (positive or 
negative) orientation toward an object. It encompasses emotions such as contentment and anger, 
attitudes such as liking and disliking, and connotative meanings in general” (Smith-Lovin, 
1995: 118f). In ACT, more specifically, affect is thought to be “a general mode of conscious-
ness” (MacKinnon, 1994: 123), it “registers our reactions to objects and events around us”, 
“accompanies our anticipation of future events and our memory of past ones”, and “marks the 
establishment and dissolution of our most intimate and intense social relationships” (MacKin-
non, 1994: 9). Furthermore, affect is supposed to be a “dynamic principle of human motivation” 
and an “important basis of human intersubjectivity” (ibid.).  
It is not always clear, however, whether ACT makes a sharp distinction between affect and 
emotion, for example when Morgan and Heise (1988) state that “unpleasant feelings and any 
sense of potent pleasure are understood readily as purely affective experiences; these are ‘emo-
tions’” (p. 29). In ACT, affective orientations towards the world (e.g., towards people, objects, 
ideas) are rather dubbed “sentiments” which refer to “the culturally shared, fundamental [affec-
tive] meanings that we associate with particular social labels” (Robinson et al., 2006: 186) and 
to the culturally established “affective associations evoked by concepts” (MacKinnon, 1994: 
22). They are “transsituational, generalized affective responses to specific symbols in a culture” 
and “more socially constructed and enduring than simple emotional responses” (Robinson et 
al., 2006: 182). In contrast, “transient” sentiments denote the situative and dynamic transfor-
mations of the more stable and rigid sentiments (ibid.). A similar understanding of sentiments 
can also be found in affect-based variants of social exchange theory, where sentiments refer to 
“enduring affective states or feelings about one or more social objects” (Lawler, 2001: 325f).  
Hence, similar to psychological constructionism, affect in ACT yields different temporal 
dynamics and can be a longer lasting orientation as well as a short-lived phenomenon. Im-
portantly, ACT also concurs with psychological constructionism in arguing that affect can be 
described along a number of dimensions (valence/arousal or evaluation/potency/activity). How-
ever, sentiments are often theorized as involving higher cognitions, gestures, and conceptuali-
zations (Gordon, 1981: 565) and ACT typically emphasizes the symbolic and conceptual rep-
resentation of sentiments and affective meaning. Nevertheless, recent developments point out 
the importance of embodied, sensorimotor representations for sentiments as well as their dy-
namic and probabilistic nature (Schröder et al., forthcoming). 
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4 Features of Affect 
Looking at these different understandings of affect, it seems fair to say that there is some re-
semblance between the “bodily capacity” view in cultural studies and perspectives on affect in 
sociology and social psychology. Both concur that affect is a general, ubiquitous, and primarily 
bodily mode of being or world-directedness that has some evaluative and experiential qualities, 
bears certain action tendencies, and is in principle independent from language, conceptual 
thought, and declarative knowledge in establishing meaning. The bodily capacity view in turn 
shares with the ontology perspective the fundamental notion that affect is relational, i.e. that it 
is not confined to individual bodies but part of the intensities of relations and resonances be-
tween bodies. Both differ, however, in the degree of their ontological premises and a number 
of further assumptions. Whereas the term affect denotes the forces between all sorts of bodies 
with little reference to feelings and emotions in the ontology account, it is used to refer to pre-
cisely these shifts in feelings and experiences in the capacity account. The term affect therefore 
either refers to a-personal, situational, and trans-situational dynamics and forces that constitute 
bodies and alter their potential to act, or it signifies processes within and certain modes of ani-
mal bodies and their physiological activity. 
One way of clarifying this fuzziness in the use of terminology might be in going back to 
Spinoza’s distinction between affectus and affectio. Seyfert (2012) has taken up this distinction 
and notes that affectus (affect) circumscribes the capability of bodies to affect and be affected, 
whereas affectio (affection) refers to the traces of bodies upon one another. In this view, “af-
fectio is the index of (changing) affective capabilities” and “certain affections are at the same 
time modal states of a body […]” (Seyfert, 2012: 32). My aim in what follows is to further 
clarify these terms and concepts to arrive at a theoretically fruitful and empirically feasible 
notion of affect that may advance current theorizing and research. I proceed by discussing im-
portant issues frequently used to characterize what affect is and how it (supposedly) differs 
from other, more conventional concepts, in particular emotion. 
4.1 Body 
Probably the most frequently mentioned characteristic of affect, both in cultural studies as well 
as in sociology and social psychology, is its bodily or embodied nature. This aligns with what 
some have called a “material turn” in cultural studies and marks a shift away from the explan-
atory value of language and discourse, mental states, and conceptual knowledge towards more 
“basic” bodily capacities, like the senses, perception, or affect. On the one hand, this dichotomy 
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is of course entirely futile, as decades of discussion in psychology, philosophy, and neurosci-
ence have shown. Language, mental states, and conceptual thought are as much bodily phe-
nomena as perception or affect are. Preaching that affect is bodily or embodied is thus mean-
ingless unless one can further qualify how, exactly, which kinds of bodies affect and are af-
fected.  
To some extent, this has been attempted by Tomkins in his idea of affect programs, includ-
ing the assumption that different categories of affect (and emotion) are realized through dedi-
cated physiological processes. Yet, a range of research linked to the psychological construc-
tionist paradigm suggests that affect and emotion are most likely not generated by such dedi-
cated systems, but instead within more general brain networks, involving basic psychological 
operations characteristic for both, affective and non-affective processing (Lindquist et al., 
2012).  
This poses some difficulties for the ontology perspective given that it assumes affect to be 
a relational force or intensity between bodies of different sorts. If we stick to this notion of 
affect, I suspect that we learn little about how actors are embedded in and make sense of the 
social world, simply because the term is too general to be of any explanatory or descriptive 
value. Instead, and in line with the capacity view and sociological as well as social psycholog-
ical conceptions, I suggest to use the term affect to denote certain modes or states of animal 
bodies that constitute a body’s capacity to act. Note that I would argue that all kinds of bodies 
do have the potential to affect other bodies. But I hold that to be affected in the sense proposed 
here is a feature of animal bodies. This means that other bodies may well be “affected” in other 
ways, but one of the defining criteria of animals, including humans, might be their potential to 
be affected in the specific ways outlined below.  
4.2 Intentionality 
The assumption that the term affect applies to bodies of various sorts is also reflected in some 
scholars’ suggestion that a defining feature of affect is that it is non-intentional, i.e. that it lacks 
a specific kind of world-directedness or “aboutness” (e.g., Leys, 2011). Although this is less 
explicit in sociological and social psychological accounts, they, too, embrace the possibility 
that affect does not bear the same intentional qualities as emotion does. This view is most likely 
endorsed to defend the specificity of affect and to further distinguish in from emotion. However, 
descriptions of affect as non-intentional harbor a limited view of intentionality as based on 
(propositional) representations and mental contents, such as beliefs. More appropriately, in my 
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view, others have suggested genuinely bodily or affective forms of intentionality that capitalize 
of human or animal bodies (e.g., Slaby, 2008).  
Affect in this view can be conceived of as an elementary and valenced bodily stance to-
wards the world, similar to what Ratcliffe (2008) calls an “existential feeling”. This bodily 
stance, in which the body is not so much implicated as a material body but as a medium of 
experience – a “feeling body” –, is not necessarily focused on a specific object, but rather re-
flects one’s entire world-directedness. These affectively intentional bodily feelings may be 
aligned towards objects, situations, or actions in the world and perceived as qualities of these 
entities and processes. In these cases, it is also possible that this „feeling towards“ (Goldie, 
2002) becomes categorized and culturally labeled as well as experienced and expressed as an 
emotion (Barrett, 2014). 
In contrast to this kind of affective intentionality, the intentional character of categorical 
and discrete emotions is much more based on mental contents and representations. For example, 
the fear of a dog requires some mental representation of a prototypical dog and the potentially 
dangerous behaviors of dogs. In contrast, affective intentionality emphasizes the entire situation 
in which the feeling body is implicated, including sensory perceptions like sounds and smells, 
possibilities for action, and various other bodily states.  
4.3 Ubiquity and continuity 
In line with the view that affect is constituted by a feeling body, there is a widely shared as-
sumption that affect is an ubiquitous and continuous mode of being. I assume that individuals 
are always in some mode or state of affect, and that this mode “colors” the ways in which people 
think, act, and how they relate to the world. I assume that the human body is usually affected 
by multiple interoceptive and exteroceptive input and mental contents (e.g., imaginations, rep-
resentations) that bring about steady fluctuations in affect, for example regarding valence or 
intensity. Affect can therefore be ever so subtle so that it is goes almost unrecognized, but nev-
ertheless colors our thoughts, perceptions, and actions, or it can be very intense, being at the 
very center of attention and bodily experience. This continuity of affect is a key feature that 
distinguishes affect from emotion and, as discussed later on, is important to understand how 
actors are embedded in social formations. 
4.4 Meaning 
Another alleged characteristic of affect is that it is non-signifying and non-discursive, and that 
bodies that affect and are affected are beyond “social sense-making”, as Whetherell (2012) 
criticizes. This conjecture seems hardly plausible given the concurrent assumption that affect 
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is an intensity that impinges on a body’s potential to act. If affect can impinge on this potential, 
how else can it do so than by conveying something that is meaningful to a body? This does not 
necessarily mean that it is meaningful in any discursive, linguistic, or propositional way, but 
may be so in an analogue way, in a way that dampens or amplifies other information and colors 
our every thought and perception. Hence, in line with existing approaches, I contend that affect 
conveys meaning, it is indeed a specific form of meaning-making. Meaning in this sense does 
not require conceptual representation or propositional thought, but may well derive from em-
bodied, sensorimotor processes and structures (Shapiro, 2011). It is debatable and a matter of 
empirical investigation, whether and how affect can be comprehensively described along dif-
ferent dimensions, for instance pleasant vs. unpleasant or arousing vs. calming, as claimed by 
some accounts. 
4.5 Language and discourse 
Another issue concerns the alleged separation of discourse and affect. Some authors seem to 
suggest that affect is distinct from discourse and language and that this is indeed one of the 
things that render the affect paradigm novel and interesting. This view is summarized (and crit-
icized) by Whetherell when she writes that “affect seems to index a realm beyond talk, words 
and texts, beyond epistemic regimes, and beyond conscious representation and cognition” 
(2012: 19). Certainly, affect in many accounts is portrayed as a counterpart to language and 
discourse. However, I would argue that both, the potential to affect and the capacity to be af-
fected are intimately tied to discourse. First, discourse itself can be thought of as a body. Dis-
course need not be text and language, but can also be images, symbols, objects with the capa-
bility to affect and to cause fluctuations in affect beyond representational logics. Riley (2005), 
for example, develops an argument for an understanding of “language as affect”, and also Butler 
(1997) can be read along these lines. Second, discourse impinges on social action, for example 
in the form of practices, and practices are also always bodily practices.  
Hence, discourse contributes to the formation of bodies and to their potential to affect and 
be affected. In this respect, Seyfert (2011) suggests an interesting analogy to Weber’s phrase 
that he (Weber) was “religiously unmusical”. He uses this phrase to suggest that bodies, as a 
consequence of being subjected to certain social, cultural, and material environments, develop 
specific susceptibilities to be affected. Latour (2004) similarly argues that bodies can “learn” to 
be affected in a specific way. I would add that this includes the susceptibility to be affected by 
different bodies (human and non-human) and in different ways. This is also in line with research 
inspired by ACT that has shown how actors with different cultural backgrounds attach different 
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“affective meanings” to various concepts (Heise, 2007). Following Whetherell (2012), I would 
think of affect as in some sense “patterned”, although with a more dynamic than static impetus. 
4.6 Summary 
The characteristics of affect discussed so far suggest that affect is a mode of being and a con-
tinuous bodily orientation towards the world that has meaningful evaluative qualities. This ori-
entation is achieved not exclusively through linguistic representation and thought, but through 
basic perceptual and evaluative capabilities of the body. Because affect is ubiquitous and con-
tinuous (like perception), it is best thought of not as something episodic, but rather in terms of 
steady fluctuations along the different dimensions on which affect may be described or in terms 
of changes in the modes of being and the sensibilities and capacities to act.  
Importantly, these fluctuations are caused by and have effects on something. Although they 
can be caused by thoughts, memories, and other (higher) cognitive processes, they are equally 
well generated outside conscious awareness. Bodies constantly register information from the 
world through their perceptual systems and hence constantly shift their affective mode. Most 
of the time, this happens subtly, without a subject being aware of these shifts. However, as a 
matter of intensity, context, or relational position, we may become aware of these shifts and 
also attribute certain causes to them. Affect has effects primarily in that it alters body’s capac-
ities to act. This can happen in various ways, through alterations to cognitive and perceptual 
processing, to the endocrine and hormonal system, or to autonomous and peripheral nervous 
system activity.  
Another important facet is that through what and in which ways bodies are affected is 
neither universal across animals or species nor uniform across historical episodes – although 
the very capacity for affect almost certainly is. As decades of research have shown, the human 
body, in its very physiology (not just regarding bodily behaviors, performances, stagings, etc.), 
is subject to processes of socialization and enculturation. This, of course, includes discourse, 
norms, values, and practices that all have a say in whether and how a body can be “affectively 
addressed” by something.  
5 Affective Relations 
From the characteristics discussed so far, a picture of affect emerges that, although related, is 
substantially different from emotions in its portrayal of how actors are embedded within and 
constitute social formations. Whereas emotions are episodic, categorical, and culturally labeled 
ways of feeling, affect is a continuous and bodily mode of being and world-directedness that is 
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initially detached from cultural classifications and categorizations. The view outlined so far 
might raise concerns that by taking sides with the capacity perspective and sociological as well 
as social psychological notions, the inherently relational character of affect, as marshaled by 
the ontology perspective, gets lost on its way. In this final section, I will argue that this is not 
the case and that the relational character of affect does not necessarily require a revisionary 
ontology. To further specify the relational qualities of affect, it is useful to first look at some 
existing understandings of relationality in affect theories and to subsequently discuss alternative 
views from the literature on relational sociology.   
Referring to Foucault’s concept of the dispositif, Seyfert (2012) has coined the term affectif 
to denote constellations or formations of affect that reflect its relational character. The term 
affectif refers to “the entirety of all heterogeneous bodies involved in the emergence of an af-
fect” (Seyfert, 2012: 31) as well as “to particular concatenations of bodies and affects” (ibid.: 
33). Borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari, Slaby (2016) uses the terms “machinic arrange-
ments” in conjunction with “domains of practice” to express a similar idea. The concept “af-
fective assemblages” (Mulcahy, 2012) is likewise inspired by Deleuze and Guattari and repre-
sents the idea that affect is in itself inherently relational. A critical argument informing these 
perspectives is that affect is framed “in terms of a constitutive relationality between bodies and 
bodies and objects, in the sense that these dynamic relations are taken to be ontologically prior 
to the entities related” (Slaby, 2016: 4). This goes hand in hand with the suggestion to see 
“social qualities as irreducibly co-constituted in relation”, where this co-constitution involves 
“other social agents and present environmental structures (synchronic relatedness), but also the 
history of interactions (diachronic relatedness)” (Mühlhoff, 2015: 1004). 
It is noteworthy that this literature refrains from engaging with established concepts of 
relationality that have been a cornerstone of sociological theorizing for decades, as is well re-
flected in recent debates over the question whether relational sociology indeed constitutes a 
paradigm shift or is just old wine in new skins. Be that as it may, the present task is not to 
merely preach relationality, but to more precisely state what relations are, how they constitute 
bodies (or actors, subjectivities, etc.), and what they have to do with affect.  
Part of this task can be achieved by looking at the works of relational sociologists (e.g., 
Prandini, 2015; Donati, 2012). This camp of scholars, much like affect theorists in cultural 
studies, criticizes individualism as well as holism and proposes to give “primacy, both ontolog-
ically and methodologically, to interactions, social ties (‘relations’), and networks” (Prandini, 
2015: 7). Very broadly, relations in this view can be conceived of in two ways (see Crossley, 
2013).i First, they can be seen as concrete ties between actors, where actors usually are human 
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beings or collective actors, such as governments, organizations, or groups (ibid.), but can like-
wise comprise objects and non-humans, such as animals, plants, or architecture (McFarlane, 
2013). Ties always involve some sort of interaction and can be thought of as a “state of play 
within an interaction history” (Crossley, 2013: 124). Ties may have different properties and 
dynamics, involving communication and expectations, exchange and collaboration, conflict, 
emotional attachments or antagonisms, and usually reflect interdependencies and power rela-
tions. Some relational sociologists focus on investigating the patterns and structures of these 
kinds of ties, often using the techniques of social network analysis, whereas others are more 
concerned with capturing the cultural and phenomenological dimensions of relations, for ex-
ample regarding the cultural models, communications, symbols, and expectations they involve 
(Fuhse, 2015). 
Second, relations can be conceived of as relative positions in a social space, as described 
by Bourdieu (1984). Bourdieu’s social space consists of the dimensions of economic and cul-
tural capital, and one’s position is determined by the volume and combination of capital. Posi-
tional relations then are expressed as some people being wealthier than others or some being 
more educated than others, but can well be extended to encompass dimensions such as capabil-
ities and practices, bodily characteristics, or status, power, and prestige. More generally, posi-
tional relations are also reflected in subject positions and their discursive and political formation 
(Törrönen, 2001). 
Both of these ideal types of relations comprise bodily and material aspects as well as sym-
bolic and discursive features. We can now think of actors as embedded into webs of relations 
of different sorts and of affect as a common quality of these relations. Affect as a continuous, 
evaluative, and bodily mode of being and world-directedness in this view is not something that 
is an “effect” of interrelated bodies, but rather is constitutive of both, bodies their relations. A 
strong thesis would be that there exists no relation without affective qualities and that these 
qualities constantly make and re-make the bodies involved.ii Bodies do not precede relations 
and interactions, but are a result of them and affect is the main facilitator of this “bodily be-
coming”.  
5.1 Examples 
One example, taken from Archer (2013), would be the teacher-pupil relation. This is a “neces-
sary” relation in the sense that pupils do not exist without teachers and vice versa. Teacher-
pupil relations can be described in terms of concrete ties involving interactions, communica-
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tions, expectations and the cultural models related to these ties. Certainly, these relations in-
volve language, conceptual thought and discursive elements, but they are equally constituted 
by teachers and pupils constantly being affected and affecting one another. Teachers “become” 
teachers not only qua knowledge and educational skills, but also qua affecting pupils in a certain 
way and qua being affected by pupils. Likewise, the affects of teacher-pupil relations are es-
sential for subjectification and the formation of self-identities. These affects constitute concrete 
ties as well as positional relations and denote, for example, physical attraction, gender differ-
ences, generational gaps, power interdependencies, institutional affordances, etc. The entirety 
of these affective relations might then well be labeled “affective arrangements”, “machinic as-
sembalges” or affectif. 
A second example are relations of humans with objects, artworks, or animals. Although 
they do not belong to the standard repertoire of relational sociology (see McFarlane, 2013, for 
a critique), they are an integral part of most affect theories in cultural studies. One need only 
think of ubiquitous consumer electronics, tech gadgets, and specific brands to estimate the af-
fective qualities of human-object relations. Also, much has already been written on the affective 
qualities of architecture which is of course not only interesting form the point of view of, say, 
aesthetics, but likewise from a spatial and societal perspective. Furthermore, recent debates on 
religious feelings and their being offended, for instance through depreciatory works of art, are 
insightful to understand the affective qualities of human-object relations. Even though in my 
understanding of affect, these examples first and foremost see the human body as being affected 
in a certain way, there is no reason for categorically excluding mutual affection, for instance in 
human-animal relations.  
A third example are relations between human and ideational bodies, such as nations. These 
relations are necessary in the sense that there are no citizens without nation states and vice 
versa. Also, they are frequently looked at in emotional terms, for instance regarding the cultur-
ally conceptualized and politicized notions of national pride and patriotism. We might equally 
come think of these relations in terms of their affective qualities that underlie these culturally 
labeled emotional episodes. For example, the affects that are inscribed in the concrete ties of 
face-to-face encounters during national celebrations, commemorations, or international sports 
tournaments or those instigated in gatherings of political parties constitute both the bodies in-
volved as well the events, for instance in terms of what some call affective atmospheres (Bren-
nan, 2004). Also, political leaders are frequently described in terms of their ability to produce 
shifts in affect, for example when even politically uninterested persons report being “moved” 
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by rhetorical aptitude. Similarly, citizens are affected by national symbols, such as flags, an-
thems, (invented) traditions, and narratives (indicating, for example, positional relations) and 
at the same time constitute these symbols through their affective meanings. These symbols may 
shift one person’s (but not another’s) affective mode momentarily or lastingly and alter one’s 
stance towards the idea of nation and the many things associated with this idea (e.g., people, 
buildings, politics, etc.), and, importantly, alter citizens’ capacities to act. 
5.2 Configurations 
Given the conceptual cornerstones and examples outlined above, we can think of human bodies 
as constituting and being embedded in social formations not exclusively, but importantly 
through affective relations with other actors, ideas, or objects. Because human bodies are con-
tinuously and simultaneously affected by different entities and themselves continuously affect 
others, they are part of a “web” or “field” of affect that has both stable and dynamic properties. 
These webs or fields comprise both concrete ties as well as positional relations and can be 
longer lasting or relatively brief, exhibiting dynamic fluctuations. For all the examples men-
tioned above, the practices and patterns of social organization are critical with regard to the 
argument that affect is central to sociality. Although affect theorists in cultural studies are keen 
to emphasize emergence, fluidity, heterogeneity, and change in affect and affective relations, 
the notions of affectif, arrangement assemblage nevertheless suggest some relevance of ordered 
social life.  
Concepts such as “affective practices” (Whetherell, 2012) or “politics of affect” (Thrift, 
2004) are attempts at linking some notion of culture, discourse, and society with that of affect. 
I suggest that this theoretical and empirical challenge can only be addressed by adequately 
combining theories and methodologies from cultural studies and the social sciences. Instead of 
resorting to rather vague terminology, it might be fruitful to consider some of the established 
concepts of social science theory and research. For example, economic sociology has provided 
fundamental insights into the social organization of contemporary capitalism and it would be 
careless to not use these insights in assessing the affective dimensions of modern capitalism, 
but to instead gloss over fine-grained differentiations with vague terminology. Similarly, to 
understand the affective implications of the challenges of multicultural and multiethnic socie-
ties, we need to ask how things like identity politics, minority rights, or social inequality con-
stitute different “affective practices” that may or may not resonate with each other. To under-
stand how individuals are embedded in occupational contexts in affective terms, one needs to 
understand the organizational structures, hierarchies, and politics of firms and corporations and 
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how they contribute to the formation of the “modern subject”. Finally, ritual theories provide 
insights into the vivid dynamics of face-to-face encounters and their affective constitution, 
which typically is contingent on factors such as norms, conflict salience, or established chore-
ographies.  
Although these examples might appear as putting notions of “structure” over those of 
“change” and “dynamics”, this is neither necessary nor intended. Issues of stability and change 
can be attended to in different ways. I suggest that affect can be patterned in specific ways, 
although this patterning certainly is more like a constant re-configuration along similar lines. 
For this patterning, discourse, language, ideologies and their bodily ramifications certainly play 
a role. I would even argue that it makes sense to also talk about “affect regimes”, similar to how 
Reddy (2008) talks about “emotion regimes”. This is not to say that discourse and ideologies 
somehow keep affective fluctuations “fixed”. Rather, it suggests that fluctuations in affect to-
wards select ideas, objects, or acts remain within a specific spectrum. More substantial changes 
and dynamics in the intensity of affect occur, for example, when people retract from current, 
familiar, or historically grown constellations of individuals, ideas, and objects and become part 
of or initiate other constellations, for instance in cases of transnational migration. This, like 
many other processes – such as rituals, electoral outcomes, political turmoil, or economic crises 
– changes the constellations themselves, which in turn can produce more intense fluctuations 
in affect and lead to substantial re-configurations of affect. 
6 Conclusion 
Affect has become an integral part of many disciplines in the humanities and in cultural studies. 
Although sociologists and social psychologists alike have incorporated the concept of affect in 
their theorizing and research even before it consolidated into this paradigm, understandings of 
affect between the different disciplines had little to no contact. In this contribution, I have ar-
gued that understandings of affect dominant in cultural studies can be fruitful to sociological 
inquiry and may complement or extend existing sociological understandings of both, affect and 
emotion. I propose to conceive of affect as a fundamental “mode of being” and a continuous 
bodily orientation towards the world with meaningful evaluative qualities. These modes of be-
ing are ubiquitous and do not have clearly identifiable beginnings and endings. They are 
brought about by interactions with other bodies (human as well as non-human) and are therefore 
best conceived of as more or less dynamic fluctuations, for instance in intensity and valence.   
Furthermore, I have proposed that although these orientations are independent from con-
ceptual thought and propositional, language-like representations, they are specifically animal, 
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in particular human, ways of being affected – other bodies might well be affected in ways that 
remain to be explored. I have argued that affect is susceptible to discourse and culture and is 
hardly ever “pre-discursive”. But because bodies are often affected without conscious aware-
ness and without necessarily involving conceptual thought, “being affected” frequently over-
rides discursive and normative knowledge and can hence become a factor in shattering estab-
lished orders. 
Although affect refers to bodies and modes of bodies, it cannot meaningfully be conceived 
of as something an individual body “has”, but rather as a quality of different types of relations 
through which interrelated bodies are constituted and constantly reshaped. In line with works 
in relational sociology, relations in this respect are concrete ties between bodies, for instance 
bodily interactions, communications or expectations, as well as positional relations and subject 
positions in a social and cultural space. Actors are therefore embedded in webs or fields of 
relations, which, although in principle dynamic and fluid, do exhibit some sort of order and 
structure. Because affect and these webs of relations are two sides of the same coin, affect 
cannot be grasped sound without concepts of ordered social life. I maintain that established and 
empirically accessible concepts such as networks, institutions, organizations, social fields, or 
systems are better suited for the task than fuzzy notions of assemblages or arrangements.  
Therefore, in juxtaposition with established perspectives on the social and cultural consti-
tution of emotion, affect yields analytical benefits in that it goes beyond categorical, episodic, 
and culturally labeled notions of evaluative feelings. This is not to say that emotions are unim-
portant. On the contrary: Affect, as conceptualized here, is one of the building blocks of emo-
tions and emotions can indeed be understood as culturally classified, contextualized, and la-
beled affect. Affect in some sense constitutes the “raw material” of an emotion, although I hold 
that it is not as “raw” as some authors suggest. But affect, because it is best conceived of as a 
ubiquitous and constantly shifting bodily mode rather than an emotional episode, considerably 
advances our understanding of various social formations and the actors and objects constituting 
these formations, from networks comprising humans and non-humans, small groups and com-
munities to nation state societies and from dynamic interactions in face-to-face encounters to 
longer lasting and mediatized attachments.  
Last but not least, theorizing in cultural studies is often highly abstract and it has remained 
opaque to many how the different concepts involved in these theories can be operationalized 
for research. The understanding of affect proposed in the present paper should be fruitful to 
empirical research because it is in many ways – though not entirely – compatible with the meth-
odological tools used in sociology and social psychology.  
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 I am not saying that this is an exhaustive classification and that there are potentially 
no other types of relations. But these two will do to illustrate the role of affect. 
ii
 This in some way reflects Barad’s (2007) concept of intra-action. 
                                                      
